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ABSTRACT 
Traditional familial care has been challenged due to the reduction of family size and 
increased mobility of the Chinese population. Institutional elder care is increasingly becoming an 
alternative to familial care. This study explores the relationship between ownership of elder care 
home and care quality, using data collected in 2010 from 157 homes in Tianjin. Two hypotheses 
were proposed for the study: 1) There is a difference between government and non government-
owned facilities in facility characteristics; 2) Government-owned facilities have better care 
quality outcomes. The t-test results showed that government-owned elder care homes had 
advantages in economic resources, staffing and the availability of services. Government-owned 
facilities reported lower mortality rate compared to non government-owned facilities. Multi-
variant regression analysis showed that economic resources—whether funding from the 
government or high payments from care-recipients in private facilities--are important factors 
predicting higher levels of care quality. These results indicate that the Chinese government 
continues to play an important role in institutional long term care; in the meantime, private 
market is increasing its prominence in the long term care market. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
With the increase in older population, the need for institutional long term care is growing. 
The quality of care and quality of life in nursing homes are important to the growing long term 
care needs of the elder population. In the United States, about two-thirds of nursing homes are 
for-profit ownership with the other one-third being non-profit owners (Grabowski & Stevenson, 
2008).  In the United States, long term care is designed to increase independence of older adults 
with chronic diseases and disabilities by providing assistance, and to provide medical care or 
nursing care for long periods of time (King, 2000, p.2). Long term care can be provided in many 
kinds of facilities, such as in a nursing home, a patient’s home or a community-based facility, to 
help with patients’ needs in their activities of daily living (ADLs) or instrumental activities of 
daily living (IADLs). Although long term care can include many forms of care services, the 
primary focus of institutional nursing care is to manage residents’ major life activities, regardless 
of whether medical services are provided in those institutions or not (Zhan, Luo & Chen, 2012). 
In China, the “Yang Lao Yuan” shares some similarities to institutional care homes in America. 
Although some research used nursing home to directly translate Yang Lao Yuan, Yang Lao 
Yuan has broader meaning than nursing homes (Zhan, Luo & Chen, 2012). The Yang Lao Yuan 
in China encompasses all kinds of long term care facilities which could provide assistance 
services or place of residence or medical services, including facilities such as nursing home, 
assisted living facility, continuing care community, retirement home, and hospice care center 
(Zhan, Luo & Chen, 2012). Thus, the terms of “elder homes” or “elder care homes” that provide 
wider connotation are more suitable to refer to institutional care in China. Research about the 
relationship between ownership and quality of care may help policy makers with decisions in 
financing, ownership change, or seeking other options in long term care (Grabowski & 
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Stevenson, 2008). Furthermore, research can also inform elders who are faced with decisions 
about choosing institutional care. In China, the development of formal long-term-care systems is 
still in the early stages. Major sources for elder care had been government-owned elder homes 
prior to 1990s (Wu, Mao & Xu, 2008). Recently, non-government elder care homes have been 
increasing due to the economic transformation (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007); policy makers may 
make decisions in public funding and design better supporting policies between the two types of 
ownership of homes for the elderly. Furthermore, care quality may be associated with quality of 
life among residents in elder care homes. Thus, it is important to understand the relationship 
between ownership and care quality in the Chinese setting for policymaker as well as consumers 
of long term care services.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between elder care home 
ownership and quality of care in the Chinese settings. The study begins by elaborating the history 
of Chinese elder care. Then, a literature review is designed to define quality of care by reviewing 
different instruments to measure this concept in previous studies. The literature review seeks to 
first understand a more comprehensive way of measuring quality of care than has been done 
previously in China. Then, a review of the literature examines existing theoretical and empirical 
research about the relationship between elder care home ownership and quality of care in the 
United States. Current research is contradictory. Some researchers have suggested that for-profit 
organizations may have higher-quality care (Chou, 2002); while others argued that not-for-profit 
organizations may provide better quality of care (Newhouse, 1970; Scanlon, 1980; Gertler, 1991). 
However, little is known about the relationship between elder care home ownership and quality 
of care in China. The aim of this research is to explore differences in quality of care among elder 
care homes with different types of ownership in urban China. 
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1.1 Background: The Development of Chinese Elder Care 
1.1.1 Elder Care Pattern in China 
The traditional care pattern for aging parents in China was familial care, which was 
mainly provided by adult children due to norms of care obligation under the Confucian doctrine 
of filial piety (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007; Zhan, 2011). Recent research showed that familial care 
pattern continues to be a dominant pattern of elder care in China, and Chinese elders receiving 
institutional care accounted for only 2-5 percent of all Chinese older population (Chu & Chi, 
2008; Zhan, Liu & Guan, 2005). Filial piety or Xiao had been a mandatory principle in Chinese 
Ancient Laws since the first dynasty----the Xia. Providing care to elderly parents has been a legal 
requirement after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 (Guan, Zhan & 
Liu, 2007; Zhan, 2011). If adult children fail to perform their filial duty under the legal 
requirements, they could be published by 5 years’ imprisonment (Zhan, 2011). In 1996, the 
government promulgated the law of “Senior Citizen’s Relative Rights and interests protection,” 
in which adult children’s legal duty to support aging parents has more specific provisions (Zhan, 
2011). With the traditional Xiao being sanctioned by mores and legal requirements, there was no 
special public service for older adults who had children until 1990s. Government provided free 
institutional care only for childless adults before 1990s (Chen, 1996; Zhan, 2011).  
The pattern of care was influenced by living arrangement and differed between urban and 
rural China. Most urban workers have stable pension and health care, and elders in cities tend to 
live independently by themselves as long as they could (Zhan, 2011). However, intergenerational 
co-residence is still a dominant living pattern, especially for rural families (Zeng et al., 2004). 
The provision of care for aging parents is different by gender roles, and sons tend to provide 
financial care and daughters tend to provide physical care (Zhan & Montgomery, 2003). Elders 
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who have multiple children often could be taken care of by children taking turns or sharing 
responsibilities (Zhan, 2002). In some urban families, if adult children are not available to care 
for elders who need daily-care, they would hire a baomu (nanny) or a homecare worker to meet 
their needs (Zhan, Feng & Luo, 2008). A baomu is usually a migrant from rural areas and most 
baomus are female. They provide physical care and do some housing chores (Zhan, 2011). In 
rural areas, sons are traditionally expected to take the major responsibility of taking care of aging 
parents. The patrilocal elder care is still the dominant pattern, and elders are expected to raise 
grandchildren in sons’ families and sons’ families are expected to take care of disabled elders 
(Zhan, 2011). However, the urbanization is challenging the traditional pattern of familial care in 
rural China, as large number of rural labors have migrated to urban labor market, and more and 
more rural families have become “empty nests” where  elders and young grandchildren are left at 
home in rural areas (Silverstein et al., 2006). Although the middle-aged children who are 
employed in urban areas could provide better financial support, they were less likely to meet the 
needs of elders’ physical care. When adult children are unable to provide disabled elders, these 
elders face dual difficulties of financial and physical dependency (Zhan, 2011). 
1.1.2 Institutional Care Development in China 
 Recent research suggests that there is increasing needs for institutional care. First, elders 
in urban areas are becoming more financially independent, and they may choose not to live with 
their adult children (Xu, 1994; Zhan, 2011). In a study of urban interior China, nearly half of 
elders who need physical assistance in their daily lives lived by themselves or with their spouses 
(Zhan & Montgomery, 2003). This change of living arrangement suggests the increasing needs 
for institutional care. Secondly, because of longer life expectancy and the one-child policy, the 
only-child couples in a family are unlikely to be able to meet the needs of older generations 
5 
 
 
(Zhan, 2011). The only-child couples would have heavy duty to take care of their elderly family 
members from both families. Institutional care is likely to supplement familial care to help 
reducing familial care burden. Finally, research has shown that the only children have less 
willingness to sacrifice their work to take care of their elder parents (Zhan, 2004). There are 
some disadvantages for only-child couples to provide traditional familial care. The only-child 
couples lack siblings to share caregiving responsibilities. In addition, as women attain higher 
levels of education, they are less available to stay at home to take care of elders (Zhan, 2011). To 
conclude, these changes influence the current and future needs for institutional care. 
Consequently, older adults who need assistance may be more likely to choose institutional care 
than in the past. 
 Before social welfare reforms in the 1990s, institutional care in China was only available 
for childless elders who had no income and no relatives (Chen, 1996). With the reduction of 
family size and increasing rural to urban migration, the needs of alternatives for familial care 
have gradually become more important for elder care since 1980s (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007). 
After the 1990’s welfare reforms, some governmental elder homes have become privatized and 
additional private elder homes have been opened by enterprises, organizations, and individuals 
(Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007). Because of economic reforms in the 1990s, former government 
welfare institutions had transitioned from 100% governmental funded to partial or completely 
financially self-reliant organization (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007). Welfare homes had to find their 
funding resource and create income to meet their expenditures (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007). The 
private elder care home industry in China is growing fast (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007). For 
example, in the first 40 years of the people’s republic of China, from 1950 to 1990 Tianjin had 
only six elder homes, and in the last 20 years between 1990 to 2010, it increased to 167 elder 
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homes (Zhan, 2011). Most of these elder care homes are non government-owned or have been 
privatized (Zhan, Liu, Guan & Bai, 2006). 
 With rapid growth of elder care facilities, quality of care has become a significant issue 
for both care consumers and policy makers, in the context of China where government’s 
ownership had dominated all services just two decades ago, the correlation between diversifying 
ownership of care homes and quality of care deserves special attention. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
           2.1 Theoretical Frame 
2.1.1 Political Economy of Aging 
To understand the quality of care and its correlation with the ownership of governmental 
and nongovernmental elder care facilities, the theory of political economy of aging provides an 
overarching theoretical framework in the Chinese text. 
The political economy of aging is a macro-level theory that emphasizes the integration of 
politics, economy, social environment, and personal experiences of aging in constructing old age, 
aging, and social policy (Estes, 2001). Socioeconomic and political factors, not individual factors, 
primarily determine the experience of aging, mainly including the structures of age, social class, 
gender, and race (Estes, 2001).The theory drew from Marxist viewpoints of the complexity of 
capitalism and how old age was socially constructed to meet the needs of the modern economy 
(Estes, 1979). Estes and her colleagues (2001) state that the class structure primarily determine 
the socio-economic position of older people in society. Their decreasing social economic status 
can be explained by their decreasing social worth and productivity (Powell, 2001).  Negative 
attitudes toward older adults are more likely to form when they withdraw from the labor market 
thereby reducing their income or social standing or both. Estes (1979, 2001) emphasized that the 
state played an important role in social provision for the aged as highlighted by the political 
economic theory. The state determines the allocation and distribution of scarce resources, and the 
allocation of retirement and pension schemes (Estes, 2001). Phillipson (1982, 1988) argues the 
reason that inequalities in the distribution of resources exist in the society is because capitalism 
leads to social marginality of older adults in key areas such as welfare. From a Marxist 
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perspective, inequalities refer to the distribution of resource within a society, not the variation of 
individual. 
 Political economy theory of aging aims to explain how and why social resources are 
unequally distributed, with a focus on how public policies reproduce existing forms of inequality. 
The theory helps understand the differences between government and non-government elder care 
homes. The pattern of elder care in China has been experiencing changes from the dominance of 
familial care to the increasing needs and usage of institutional care, due to the development of 
market economy. The elder care homes have also transited from absolute governmental 
ownership to co-existence of governmental and non-governmental ownership. Do inequalities 
exist in resource distributions for the aged by the state to elder care institutions with different 
ownership? If so, what kinds of inequalities lead to the different care quality and life quality 
among older residents? Utilizing the insight of political economy, this study examines how the 
change of larger social environment from a socialist (or solo government-owned welfare 
institutions) to a market economy may lead to the re-distribution of resources, which, in turn, 
may lead to the differences in quality of care, and the personal experiences of aging. 
2.2 Defining Quality of Care  
In the United States, the quality of care in nursing homes has been a long-standing 
concern of governments, the public, policymakers, and nursing homes (Arling, Job & Cooke, 
2009). This issue has been studied for decades in order to establish standard of care practices in 
all facilities (Grabowski & Stevenson, 2008). Many instruments for assessing care quality in 
nursing homes have been proposed, but none of these has been universally accepted (Comondore 
et al., 2009). According to Donbedian (1988), care quality can be conceptualized as three 
components: structure, process and outcome, generally referred to as the SPO framework. The 
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SPO framework was a popular model that has been applied for assessment of care quality in 
healthcare systems (Goodson, Jang & Rantz, 2008).  
Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs, which rely on performance measures and have 
been operating in nursing homes in some states, used the SPO framework to assess care quality 
in nursing homes. The pay-for-performance program is a financial incentive strategy to promote 
care quality in nursing homes by rewarding care performance (Arling, Job & Cooke，2009). 
Arling, Job and Cooke (2009) surveyed P4P programs in nursing homes of six states by applying 
performance measures that referred to care quality in those P4P systems included “general areas 
of structure (organizational resources and input), process (care practices and treatment), and 
outcomes (impacts on health, function, and quality of life)” (p. 588-589).  
Structure could be measured by staffing levels such as nurses’ skill levels and direct-care 
staffing hours; care process could be measured by evaluating available services such as dietary 
services; and care outcome could be measured by the impacts of the physical and mental care 
such as pressure sores and satisfaction with their overall care (Arling et al., 2009). Though it is 
widely used, the SPO framework was not regarded as a completely perfect model for measuring 
care quality. Atchley (1991) added a time dimension to the SPO framework. Unruh and Wan 
(2004) argued causal connection was lacking among structure, process and outcomes in the 
framework, and the link among these three components should be taken into account in the SPO 
framework, and structural equation modeling could be constructed to improve this model. 
The Observable Indicators of Nursing Home Care Quality Instrument (OIQ) was 
developed by qualitative studies, and dimensions of care quality were described from consumers, 
providers and regulators through on-site visit (Goodson, Jang & Rantz, 2008). Rantz and his 
colleagues developed a comprehensive model to define care quality in nursing homes, and seven 
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dimensions were encompassed into the model, including “central focus of the agency is on 
residents, families, staff, and community; care; communication; environment; home; and family 
involvement” (Goodson, Jang & Rantz, 2008, p.4). Through a series of field tests in nursing 
homes and analyses of the test results, OIQ was proved to be a valid and reliable instrument for 
measuring the care quality in nursing homes (Rantz et al., 2006). 
The SPO framework and OIQ instrument encompass relatively comprehensive and 
extensive meaning of care quality.  Another approach to care quality focuses on clinical quality 
indicators just measuring residents’ health outcomes associated with care quality. A set of 
clinical quality indicators (QIs), which were developed by researchers at the Center for Health 
System Research and Analysis at the University of Wisconsin-Madison,  has been utilized to 
measure the residents’ health status in a facility (Goodson, Jang & Rantz, 2008). The Clinical 
Quality indicators (QIs) mainly include pressure sores, physical or chemical restraints, and the 
decline or improvement in activities of daily living (ADLs), mental status etc. (Arling et al. 
2009). Even though the QIs were widely used to differentiate levels of care quality, it was 
criticized for its flaws in accuracy and the validity of indicators (Harrington et al., 2001). Karon, 
Sainfor, and Zimmerman (1999) established the QIs ranking to provide a quantitative analysis 
for overall quality of nursing homes. In addition, Rantz and his colleagues (2004) established 
classification of care quality level based on their individual scores on QIs, and the overall 
classification for the facility (good, average, or poor) was determined by their individual overall 
scores.  
Residents’ health outcome is emphasized in direct measures of care quality in the federal 
Medicare/Medicaid laws and state licensing laws. Under the federal Medicare/Medicaid Laws 
and state licensing laws, quality of care in nursing homes has emphasized on the outcomes of 
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residents’ health, including “activities of daily living, vision and hearing, and pressure sores” 
(Gittler, 2008, p.267).  
In some empirical studies, outcomes of residents’ health or clinic quality indicators are 
applied to measure care quality by various items related to health status. Based on a systematic 
review of measures of care quality conducted by Comondore and his colleagues (2009),  three 
types of measures are frequently used to measure health outcomes of residents,  they are pressure 
ulcer prevalence, psychoactive drug use (such as anti-anxiety, sedative, hypnotic, and 
antipsychotic drugs), and physical restrain use. Pressure ulcers or bedsores referred to as 
erosion of the skin caused by lack of blood supply or friction (Bowlis, 2009). The Institute of 
Medicine emphasized pressure ulcers as an important measure to indicate care quality 
(Comondore, 2009). Physical restraints can prevent residents from injuring, but can diminish 
dignity of residents and increase risk of pressure ulcers and mental illness (Comondore, 2009). 
“Antipsychotics are a class of medications used to treat psychosis” (Bowlis, 2009, p.12). Higher 
use of antipsychotics would cause negative results such as suicide and pre-mature death, and 
higher use of antipsychotics is associated with lower care quality (Bowlis, 2009). Mortality is 
also used as an important indicator to reflect care quality. Chou (2002) asserted that quality of 
care in nursing homes should be measured by negative health outcomes, but mortality was also 
an indicator of care quality. Zinn, Aaronson, and Rosko (1993) found that higher mortality rates 
are associated with lower occupancy rates of residents in nursing homes. Higher rates of all these 
measures were associated with lower care quality.  
 To conclude, the SPO framework encompasses wide dimensions of care quality, but the 
connections between dimensions are ignored in this framework. The clinical quality indicators 
can directly reflect health outcome, which is the outcome measure in the SPO framework. This 
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study uses the clinical quality indicators to define and measure quality of care, and then explore 
the relationship among ownership, and quality of care after controlling for other factors. Because 
the majority of existing clinical quality indicators are based on measures in United States and 
untested in the Chinese context, four measures—mortality, pressure ulcers, physical restraints 
and antipsychotics—were used to measure quality of care in this study, based on existing 
database. Facility characteristics associated with residents’ health outcome are explored as well 
as the relationship between facility characteristics and care quality. 
2.3 Facility Characteristics Associated with Care Quality in Nursing Homes 
 From the structure and process measures in the SPO framework, facility characteristics 
are important factors associated with quality of care could be determined. Structure measures 
mainly include ownership, economic resources, and residents’ characteristics, and Process 
measures mainly include staffing and availability of services. 
2.3.1 Ownership 
Ownership of nursing homes in the United States has been generally divided into for-
profit and not-for-profit. In some literatures, they have different names such as investor-owned 
and nonprofit nursing homes (O’Nell, Harrington, Kitchener & Saliba, 2003), as well as, 
proprietary and nonproprietary nursing homes (Harrington, Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo & 
Himmelstein, 2001). For-profit nursing homes may be owned by individuals, partnership, or 
corporation, and not-for-profit nursing homes may be owned by church, nonprofit corporation or 
governments (Grabowski & Stevenson, 2008). There are two types of ownership of nursing 
homes in China: government-owned and non government-owned, with nongovernment 
ownership having diverse types that includes community-owned, enterprise-owned, and private-
owned elder care homes (Zhan et al., 2006).  
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In the empirical literature about the relationship between ownership and quality of care in 
nursing homes in the United States, there is a general understanding that non-profit nursing 
homes provide higher quality of care than for-profit nursing homes (Harrington et al., 2001; 
O’Neill et al., 2003; Grabowski & Stvenson, 2008). Harrington et al. (2001) analyzed the 1998 
data from state inspections of 13,693 nursing facilities by using multivariate models and 
concluded that investor-owned nursing homes provided worse quality of nursing care than not-
for profit. Similarly, O’Neill et al. (2003) found that proprietary homes in California had 
significantly lower quality of care than nonproprietary homes when examining the relationship 
between profit level and quality in both two types of homes. Grabowski and Stevenson (2008) 
examined the effects of “ownership conversions” (p. 1184) on nursing home performance and 
found that nursing homes converting from non-profit to for-profit showed decreases in their 
performances, and in contrast, nursing homes converting from for-profit to non-profit showed 
general improvement. 
Earlier research has indicated the diversification of different types of elder care home 
ownership in China; however, there is a dearth of literature about the relationship between 
ownership and quality of care in the Chinese elder care homes system. Zhan and her colleagues 
(2006) surveyed 12 elder homes sites and interviewed 265 older residents in Tianjin city 
focusing on attitudes of the elderly toward elder care homes. They found that government-owned 
elder care homes had advantages in financing, staffing, and access to medical insurance. The 
overall quality in government-owned elder homes was evaluated to be higher than non 
government-owned homes. However, in this study, the quality of care in elder care homes was 
judged just from facility characteristics based on staffing and elders’ evaluation. Quality of care 
such as care practice and residents’ health outcome was not considered.  
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2.3.2 Economic Resources 
Economic Resources mainly refers to organizational resources and input of nursing 
homes and they could be identified as one of structure measures. Financial input would ensure 
the operation and higher care quality of a nursing home. Financial input mainly refers to funding 
resources and medical insurance. Some studies found that higher proportion of Medicaid 
residents were negatively associated with nursing quality and staff levels (Grabowski, 2001; 
Harrington & Swan, 2003). However, another study did not find that the percentage of Medicaid 
residents negatively influenced outcome of care quality (Chesteen, Helgheim, Randall & Wardell, 
2005). Furthermore, Harrington and colleagues (2001) found that the percentage of Medicare 
residents could indicate higher levels of care quality in nursing homes.  
In the study of Zhan and her colleagues (2006), only three elder care homes, among 12 
elder care homes investigated in Tianjin, China, and was found to have established association 
with medical insurance company, and the rest of elder care homes could not be medically insured. 
Elders in un-insured elder homes could not receive the reimbursement for their medical bills and 
hospitalization, and their access of medical services would be limited (Zhan et al., 2006). Lack of 
medical insurance would understandably affect quality of care. 
2.3.3 Residents’ Characteristics 
Residents’ Characteristics refer to current residents’ information in each elder care home. 
These characteristics mainly refer to their basic demographics, including payment source, 
clinical and functional characteristics. In China, payment sources mainly include “out of pocket”, 
“pensions”, “and welfare recipients.” Clinical characteristics refer to the prevalence of residents 
with illness, such as dementia, which refers to their status when residents’ entered their facility. 
The daily functioning refers to the three aspects of activities of daily living (ADL), including 
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eating, toileting and transferring (Harrington et al., 2001). The proportion of residents needing 
assistance in ADLs could be different in different elder care homes. In the study of 2009’s data 
from elder care homes in Nanjing city, China, Feng and  his colleagues (2011) found that the 
level of residents’ needs for assistance in ADLs and the prevalence of residents with dementia 
was significantly higher in non-governmental than governmental homes, and government 
facilities had more welfare recipients than nongovernment homes.  
The functional and mental health status of residents could impact on their quality of life 
in homes and outcomes of care. Since it is difficult to collect clinic quality data in decline or 
improvement in dementia and in ADLs, the different level of needs in ADLs when residents 
were accepted by facilities could be utilized to predict care quality in elder care homes in this 
study.  
2.3.4 Availability of Services 
Process measures of the SPO framework refer to the care practice and treatment, 
including “resident rights, dietary services, and physical environment, or other services”, “scope 
and severity of deficiencies in clinical care” (Arling et al., 2009). In the United States, the data 
process measures are obtained from nursing home inspection data.  Lacking of the inspection 
data, regarding the provision of services, could lead to the deficiency of care practice and 
treatment. Therefore, the information of availability of services could be an important indicator 
of care quality. In this study, the availability of services is measured by the total number of 
services among seven basic services in elder care homes, including accommodation, dietary 
services, nursing care, recreation facility, medical services, rehabilitation services, and hospice 
care. 
2.3.5 Staffing 
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Staffing was defined as overall staffing levels, number of staff per resident, and ratio of 
registered nurses and unlicensed staff (Havig, Skogstad, Kjekshus & Romoren, 2011). Staffing 
was emphasized as an important measure of structure within the SPO framework by the US 
Medicare/Medicaid nursing home regulations (Comondore et al., 2009). In three literature 
reviews of care quality in this field, researchers examined the relationship of staffing level and 
the effect of registered and care quality by identifying quality indicators, and found that most 
indicators were found to have significant positive association with staffing level and the effect of 
registered staff (Bostick, Rantz, Flesner & Riggs, 2006; Castle, 2008; Spilsbury, Hewitt, Stirk, 
Bowman, 2011). However, some studies did not find any link between staffing and care quality 
(Rantz et al. 2004, Winslow & Borg, 2008; Arling et al., 2007; Berlowitz et al., 1999). For 
example, Rantz and his colleagues (2004) investigated 92 nursing homes in Missouri and 
collected reliable staffing data and did not find any effect of staffing level in relation of quality 
of care. In this study, staffing was measured by percentage of trained caregivers, percentage of 
migratory care staff, and ratio of professional physician to residents, ratio of professional 
caregivers to residents, and staff turnover rate.  
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CHAPTER 3 PURPOSE AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Purpose of Research 
 The purpose of the proposed research is to explore the relationship between the 
ownership of elder care homes and quality of care in institutional care settings of urban China. 
The aim of this study is to increase the understanding of ownership-related differences in quality 
of care in elder care homes. The four factors—economic resources, staffing, availability of 
services, residence characteristics—are different indicators of care quality. Quality of care can be 
measured by health outcomes of residents, including pressure ulcers, physical restraints, 
antipsychotics, and mortality. However, in this study, only mortality rate is examined. Figure one 
demonstrates the conceptual model of the study. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of Relationship between Ownership and Care Quality in 
Urban Chinese Context 
Two research questions were raised to explore the relationship among these 
measurements: 1) Is there any difference in care quality between governmental-owned and non-
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governmental owned elder care homes? 2) How are those factors related to the outcome 
measures between the two different kinds of elder care homes? Based on the literature review 
and the two research questions, I proposed the following hypotheses corresponding to the two 
questions above. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
 Based on the two research questions, two sets of hypotheses are proposed.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a difference between government and nongovernment elder care 
homes in measures of facility characteristics, including economic resources, staffing, the 
availability of services and residents’ characteristics.  
Hypothesis 1a: There is a difference between government and nongovernment elder care 
homes in economic resources: Government-owned elder care institutions are more likely to have 
more economic resources. 
 Hypothesis 1b: There is a difference in staffing between government and nongovernment 
elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions are more likely to have higher level 
of staffing. 
Hypothesis 1c: There are differences in the availability of services between government 
and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions are likely to 
have availability of greater number of services.  
Hypothesis 1d: There is a difference in residents’ characteristics between government and 
nongovernment elder care homes. 
Hypothesis 1d (i): There is a difference in ADL level of residents received by 
government and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care homes are 
likely to have fewer residents with ADL impairments. 
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Hypothesis 2: There is an association between the type of elder care homes (government 
vs. non-government) and health outcomes of care quality. 
Hypothesis 2a: Residents in government-owned facilities are more likely to report lower 
levels of mortality. 
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CHAPTER 4 DATA, SETTING AND MEASURES 
4.1 Data and settings 
The city selected for this research is Tianjin, a municipality directly governed by the 
Central Government, which is located roughly 120 kilometers east of Beijing (stats-tj.gov, n.d.). 
Tianjin city has 14.5% of the total population that are 60 years and over by the end of 2003 
(Zhan et al., 2006).  Because of lack of specific definition of elder care institution, elder care 
homes in this study are defined as those facilities that provide long-term elder care for older 
adults. 
The target population is all elder care homes located in urban districts of Tianjin. The 
homes located in rural areas of the city are excluded. From the official listing of all registered 
elder care homes in Tianjin, 157 homes were eligible to be surveyed. A survey questionnaire was 
created according to On-line Survey Certification Automated Record (OSCAR) instrument in the 
United States and was adjusted to adapt to the Chinese setting (Feng et al., 2011). 
4.2 Measures 
4.2.1 Elder Care Home Ownership 
 In the survey, the ownership of elder care homes is divided into two types: government 
and nongovernment. Government elder care homes are divided into “City Government Owned”, 
“District or County Owned”, “Street or Community Owned”, “Private Running and Government 
Owned”. Nongovernment elder care homes are divided into “Individual Owned”, “Partnership 
Owned”, “Enterprise Owned”, “Work Unit Owned”, “Foreign Investment”, “Church Initiated”, 
“Charity Institute Owned” And “Other”. All government ownership elder care homes are non-
profit. Nongovernment ownership elder care homes include for-profit and non-profit elder care 
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homes. Although there are many different categories within the types, this study focused 
exclusively on the government owned vs. non-government owned distinction.   
4.2.2 Quality of Care 
Quality of care was measured by the prevalence of pressure ulcer, physical restraints, and 
the usage rate of antipsychotics and hypnotic, and mortality rate. The prevalence of pressure 
ulcer is defined as the percentage of persons who suffered from pressure ulcers. The prevalence 
of physical restraints use is defined as the percentage of persons confined in bed or chairs to 
prevent injuring in each facility. The prevalence of antipsychotics is defined as the usage rate of 
tranquilizer (defined as the proportion of the number of residents who take tranquilizer). 
Mortality rate was defined as the percentage of residents who died during 2010. 
4.2.3 Factors Associated with Care Quality 
Factors associated with care quality were measured by economic resources, staffing, 
availability of services and residence characteristics. Economic resources were defined by the 
acquirement of funding from government, including the total investment when established and 
the proportion of government investment for establishment, the proportion of government’s 
financial support for daily income, the proportion of daily income from charging residents, and 
the amount of governmental monthly subsidies (the amount of subsidies of every bed per month). 
The staffing level that is related to quality of care was measured by the percentage of 
trained caregivers, percentage of migratory care staff, ratio of professional physicians to 
residents (defined by the number of professional physicians divided by the number of residents 
multiply 100), ratio of professional caregivers to residents (defined by the number of 
professional caregivers divided by the number of residents), and staff turnover rate (defined by 
the number of staff turnover divided by the number of staff in 2010). 
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The availability of services was measured by the provision of the number of services out 
of seven basic services in elder care homes. These services include accommodation, dietary 
services, nursing services, recreation facility, medical services, rehabilitation services, and 
hospice care. Furthermore, it is also measured by the number of total services.  
Resident characteristics were measured by the percentage of residents with ADL 
disabilities including feeding, dressing as well as moving.  
4.3 Performed Analysis 
The data was analyzed by using descriptive statistics to identify the characteristics of 
elder care homes included in the study. To test the differences in the characteristics of 
government-owned and non government-owned elder care homes, the researcher analyzed 
economic resources, staffing, the availability of services, residents’ characteristics and care 
quality measures in relation to ownership types. Chi-square and t-tests were performed to 
understand the differences between government and government elder care homes with these 
measures. Further, to understand the associations between ownership, facility characteristics, and 
health outcomes of care quality, a multivariate regression analysis was performed by using these 
variables: quality of care measured by mortality as dependent variables and characteristics of 
organizations as independent variables. All statistical data was analyzed by using PASW 
Statistics 18. 
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Organizational characteristics are presented in Table 1. Among the total sample of 157 
elder care homes, there were 20 government-owned elder care homes consisting approximately 
12.7%. The majority (65.8%) of all elder care homes were established after the year of 2000. 
Among non government-owned elder care homes, 70.1% were established after 2000, compared 
to only 40.0 % of government ownership. However, 40% of government-owned elder care 
homes were established before 1990, compared with 1.7% of nongovernment. Therefore, most of 
non-government owned facilities were built within the last ten years. The average number of 
beds per home among the whole sample is 109.8, and the average occupancy rate was about 
78.4%. Nineteen percent of all elder care homes are under expansion.  
5.2 Statistics Results for Hypothesis 1 
 To understand the differences between governmental and nongovernmental elder care 
facilities, multiple t-tests were performed for continuous dependent variables and chi-square tests 
were performed for categorical dependent variables.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a difference between government and nongovernment elder care 
homes in measures of facility characteristics, including economic resources, staffing, the 
availability of services and residence characteristics. 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a difference between government and nongovernment elder care 
homes in economic resources: Government-owned elder care institutions are more likely to have 
more economic resources. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics：Organizational Characteristic and Comparison of Means 
  Ownership 
Whole Sample (n=157) Non government-owned 
(n=137) 
Government Owned 
(n=20) 
 
N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std. T/F Value P. 
Organization                
Year of 
Establishment >=2000 
104 65.8   96 70.1   8 40.0   7.058 .008**  
   Year of Establishment                             
1990-1999 
41 25.9   37 27.0   4 20.0   .444 .505  
Year of 
Establishment<1990 
12 7.6   4 1.7   8 40.0   33.724 .000*** 
Total Number of Beds    109.8 85.3   104.0 80.4   149.8 107.5 -2.270 .025* 
Occupancy Rate    78.4 20.9   76.5 21.1   91.0 14.4 -3.904 .000*** 
Under Expansion  30 19.0   25 18.2   5 25.0   .515 .473  
Owned by Government  20 12.7             
Hospital Based  11 7.0   9 6.6   2 10.0   .315 .574 
Note: “N” represents frequency, “ %” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from 
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and 
1 represents Government Ownership. 
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To understand differences in economic resources between governmental and non-
governmental elder care homes, five measures as previously mentioned were used. Table 2 
displays the T-test results. As shown in Table 2, government-owned homes had more average 
investment funding, compared to non government-owned facilities (4.7 million RMB vs. 1.0 
million RMB, P.=.000, p<.001). Government-owned facilities report higher average proportion 
of government investment when established than non government-owned homes (83.1% vs. 
3.4%, P. =.000, p<.001). In terms of the average proportion of daily income, non government-
owned homes reported higher proportion from charging residents, in comparison of government-
owned facilities (95.8% vs. 66.0%, P.=.000, p<.01). Government-owned homes had higher 
proportions of government’s financial support for daily income, compared to non government-
owned facilities (30.2% vs. 1.9%, P.=.000, p <.001). Among homes received monthly 
government subsidies, government-owned elder care facilities have higher average amount of 
subsidies of every bed per month than non government-owned homes (60.5 RMB vs. 49.3 RMB, 
P.=.001, p<.01).  
 Hypothesis 1b: There is a difference in staffing between government and nongovernment 
elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions are more likely to have higher level 
of staffing.  
  To understand differences in staffing between governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations, five measures were used in comparative analysis. Table 3 shows the detail of the 
result. Government-owned facilities, however, had significantly higher ratio of professional 
physicians to residents and ratio of professional caregivers to residents, higher percentage of 
trained caregivers than non government-owned homes (1.5% vs. 0.7%, p <.05; 13.6% vs. 9.8%, 
p <.05; 83.1% vs. 61.6%, p<.01). 
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Table 2: Bivariate Result: Ownership VS. Economic Resources 
  Ownership 
Whole Sample (n=157) Non government-owned 
(n=137) 
Government Owned 
(n=20) 
 
 
N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std. T/F Value P. 
Economic Resources                
Total Investment When 
Established (million RMB) 
  1.4 3.6   1.0 2.8   4.7 6.8 -3.970 .000***  
Government Investment 
(%) 
  11.6 31.5   3.4 17.5   83.1 35.6 -14.628 .000*** 
Daily Income-----Charging 
from residents (%) 
  92.1 19.3   95.8 10.2   66.0 39.7 7.290 .000*** 
Daily Income-----
Government’s Financial 
Support (%) 
  5.4 16.4   1.9 5.8   30.2 36.2 -8.495 .000*** 
The Amount of Subsidies 
for  Every Bed(RMB) 
      49.3 4.4   60.5 21.0 -.3.525 .001** 
Note: “N” represents frequency, “ %” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from 
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and 
1 represents Government Ownership. 
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Table 3: Bivariate Result: Ownership VS. Staffing level 
  Ownership 
Whole Sample (n=157) Non government-owned 
(n=137) 
Government Owned 
(n=20) 
 
T/F Value 
 
P. 
N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std.   
Staffing Level               
Ratio of Professional 
Caregivers to Residents 
*100(%) 
  10.3 7.7   9.8 7.6   13.6 7.5 -2.101 .037* 
Ratio of Professional 
Physicians to Residents 
*100(%) 
  0.8 1.5   0.7 1.2   1.5 2.2 -2.348 .020* 
Trained Carers (%)   64.4 35.4   61.6 35.5   83.1 29.1 -2.983 .006** 
% Migratory Care Staff   6.4 12.5   7.1 13.1   2.0 4.8 3.285 .002** 
Turn-Over Rate of Staff (%)   6.3 13.7   6.8 14.5   2.7 4.6 2.527 .013* 
Note: “N” represents frequency, “ %” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from 
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and 
1 represents Government Ownership. 
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Non government-owned facilities had slightly higher proportion of migratory direct-care staff 
and higher turn-over rate of staff in 2010 compared to non government-owned homes (7.1% vs. 
2.0 %, p< .01; 6.8% vs. 2.7%, p<.05),  
Hypothesis 1c: There are differences in the availability of services between government 
and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions are more likely 
to have higher availability of services. 
Table 4 shows the measurements of available services. As shown in Table 4, all the 
investigated elder care homes provided accommodation and dietary services. There were no 
significant differences in the provision of recreation facility, medical services, rehabilitation 
services and hospice services between two types of facilities. More non government-owned 
facilities had nursing services, compared to non government-owned homes (99.3% vs.90.0%, 
P.=.005, p<.01). Government-owned facilities had higher average number of total services than 
non government-owned facilities (6.1 vs. 5.6, P.=.015, p<.05).  
Hypothesis 1d: There is a difference in residents’ characteristics between government 
and nongovernment elder care homes. 
Hypothesis 1d (i): There is a difference in ADL level of residents received in government 
and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care homes are likely to have 
fewer residents with ADL impairment. 
The bivariate results of ownership and residents’ characteristics are presented in Table 5. 
No significant differences are found in the percentage of residents that need help in feeding 
dressing and transferring between these two types of facilities. Thus, the hypothesis 1d(i) was 
rejected. Two measures, needing help with feeding (P=.053) and movement (P=.063), are at 
marginal, yet not statistically significant, levels, indicating government-owned facilities, may 
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have residents who were less likely to need feeding and assistance with movement. These 
findings deserve more attention in future research.   
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Table 4: Bivariate Result: Ownership VS. Availability of Services 
  Ownership 
Whole Sample (n=158) Non government-owned 
(n=137) 
Government Owned 
(n=20) 
 
 
 
 
N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std. T/F Value P. 
Availability of Services               
Accommodation (%) 157 100   137 100   20 100     
Dietary Services（%） 157 100   137 100   20 100     
Nursing Services（%） 154 98.1   136 99.3   18 90.0   8.002 .005** 
Recreation Facility (%) 139 88.5   119 86.9   20 100   2.968 .085 
Medical Services (%) 76 48.4   61 44.5   15 75.0   6.904 .011* 
Recovery Services (%) 86 54.8   72 52.6   14 70.0   2.144 .143 
Hospice Care (%) 121 77.1   105 76.6   16 84.2   .549 .459 
Number of Services       5.6 0.9   6.1 1.2 -2.468 .015* 
Note: “N” represents frequency, “%” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from 
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and 
1 represents Government Ownership. 
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Table 5: Bivariate Result: Ownership VS. Resident Characteristics 
  Ownership 
Whole Sample (n=157) Non government-owned 
(n=137) 
Government Owned 
(n=20) 
 
 
 
N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std. T/F Value P. 
Resident Characteristics               
% of Residents that Need 
Feeding 
  25.8 22.2   26.9 22.8   18.4 16.7 2.009 .053 
% of Residents that Need 
Dressing 
  57.3 26.4   58.3 25.2   50.6 33.3 1.212 .228 
% of Residents that Need 
Help with Moving 
  57.4 25.7   58.9 24.9   47.6 29.0 1.843 .067 
Note: “N” represents frequency, “%” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from 
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and 
1 represents Government Ownership. 
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5.3 Statistics Results for Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 is proposed to test the association between different types of ownership of 
the facility and care quality as measured by mortality rate. 
A t-test was performed to understand the differences in four measures of care quality 
between government-owned and non government-owned facilities. As shown in Table 6, no 
significant difference was found in the prevalence of pressure ulcer, physical restrain use and 
using tranquilizer between these two types of facilities. A major difference was found in 
mortality rate: non government-owned homes showed significantly higher mortality rate than 
government-owned homes in 2010 (11.1% vs. 4.0%, Sig. =.000, p<.001).  
To further understand the relationship between ownership and care quality, a multiple 
regression analysis was conducted to understand the influence of ownership on the outcome 
measure of care quality. Since three measures showed no statistical significance at bi-variate 
level, only mortality rate was selected as the dependent variable, and five groups of facility 
characteristics were utilized as independent variables, including organizations characteristics 
(ownership), economic resources, staffing, the availability of services, and residents’ 
characteristics. Because mortality rate was a continuous variable, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression analysis was utilized to understand the influence of five groups of independent 
variables in mortality rate. Five regression models were used to assess the relationship between 
ownership and mortality rate. To optimize the models, variables that were not found statistically 
significantly in previous t-tests, were removed from further analysis in the five models of 
regression analysis. The remaining variables were selected and entered in five different steps in 
five groups to allow a conceptual understanding of how each group of variables influence 
mortality rate between government and non-government elder care facilities (see Table 7).  
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In Table 7, Model 1 showed that ownership, or government owned facilities was 
negatively related to mortality rate, but this correlation was not statistically significant (R2=.011, 
P=.434). Model 2, 3, 4, and 5 showed that each group of variable, when entered into the equation, 
increased explained variance and was statistically significant. Model 2, economic resources, was 
shown to be the stronger predictor for mortality rate. This group of variable explained 36% of 
variance. In Model 5, when the percentage of residents with ADL disabilities was added into the 
equation, it increased the explained variation of mortality by 13% compared to Model 2. 
Facilities that received lower proportion of daily income from residents had lower level of 
mortality rate. The proportion of government’s financial support for daily income (Model 5, B=-
.492, p< .05) showed negative and moderate significance in association with mortality rate: the 
less financial support facilities receive the highest mortality rate. Facilities that receive higher 
levels of government support for daily income had lower mortality rate. Ownership, per se, 
showed no statistical significance in mortality rate in all 5 Models. 
To Conclude (See Table 8), hypothesis 1 examined the difference between government 
and nongovernment elder care homes in measures of facility characteristics, including economic 
resources, staffing, availability of services and residence characteristics. Findings in this study 
supported hypothesis 1a, 1b and 1c, and 1d was rejected.  
Hypothesis 1a hypothesized that there was a difference between government and 
nongovernment elder care homes in economic resources: Government-owned elder care 
institutions were more likely to have more economic resources. Specifically these differences are 
shown in total amount of investment at the time of establishment, percentage of government 
investment, and the percentage of government financial support as daily income.  Government 
funded elder care home were receiving more subsidies for every bed. 
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Hypothesis 1b examined staffing differences between government and non-government 
elder care homes. It was hypothesized that there was a difference in staffing between government 
and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions were more 
likely to have higher level of staffing. Staffing was examined by five indicators, two examined 
staff (professional caregivers and professional physicians) and  resident ratio; three examined 
qualitative differences in staffs, including percentage of trained staff  which indicates better 
quality, percentage of  migratory staff which suggests poor quality due to  lack of training and 
stability, and turn-over rate which is often an indicator of  quality of care.  Findings revealed that 
overall, government funded elder care homes were more likely to have higher staff-to-resident 
ratio, and better quality of staffs, and lower turn-over rate.  Hypothesis 1b is therefore supported. 
Hypothesis 1c stated that there were differences in the availability of services between 
government and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions are 
likely to have availability of greater number of services. Findings showed that government 
funded elder care homes had an average of 6 services available (p<.05) compared to 5 in non-
government funded elder care homes.  This hypothesis is supported. 
Hypothesis 1d examined the difference in ADL level of residents received by government 
and nongovernment elder care homes. It was hypothesized that government-owned elder care 
homes are likely to have fewer residents with ADL impairments. From previous study in China 
(Feng, et al., 2011), governmental elder care homes tended to have fewer residents with needs in 
ADLs than nongovernmental homes, which means governmental elder care homes accept 
healthier residents and the quality of care will be affected by the characteristics of residents. In 
this study, findings showed that no difference was shown in the percentage of residents that need 
feeding, dressing and help in moving. Therefore, hypothesis 1d is rejected. 
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Hypothesis 2 was designed to examine if there is an association between the type of elder 
care homes (government vs. non-government) and health outcomes of care quality (the 
prevalence of pressure ulcer, the prevalence of physical restrain use, the prevalence of taking 
hypnotic, the prevalence of taking tranquilizer and mortality rate). The mortality rate was used as 
a representative measure of health outcomes through a t-test between ownership and care quality. 
The relationship between ownership and mortality was examined by a regression analysis in 
hypothesis 2a: Residents in government-owned facilities are more likely to report lower levels of 
mortality. Finding showed that two variables in economic resources—the proportion of daily 
income from residents’ fee and the proportion of government’s financial support for daily 
income—highly predict mortality rate. 
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Table 6: Bivariate Result: Results Ownership VS. Care Quality 
  Ownership 
Whole Sample (n=157) Non government-owned 
(n=137) 
Government Owned 
(n=20) 
 
 
N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std. N % Mean Std. T/F Value P. 
Care Quality               
The Prevalence of Pressure 
Ulcer (%) 
  .3 1.0   .4 1.1   .1 .3 1.983 .050 
The Prevalence of Physical 
Restrain Use (%) 
  5.3 11.1   4.7 9.2   9.4 19.6 -1.787 .076  
The Prevalence of Taking 
Tranquilizer (%) 
  2.3 4.8   2.4 5.0   1.9 3.1 .536 .596 
Mortality Rate (%)   10.2 17.4   11.1 18.4   4.0 3.7 3.949 .000*** 
Note: “N” represents frequency, “%” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from 
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and 
1 represents Government Ownership. 
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Table 7: Multiple Regression Results for Variables Predicting Care Quality 
Note: Significant levels: * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001(two-tailed test). Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment 
Ownership and 1 represents Government Ownership. 
Predictor Variables Standardized Coefficientsb 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Organizational Characteristics       
Ownership  -.10 -.08 -.12 -.14 -.10 
Economic Resources      
The total amount of Government’s Investment for Establishment  -.06 -.14 -.15 -.09 
The Proportion of Government’s Financial for Establishment  .02 .12 .13 .12 
The Proportion of Daily Income from Residents’ Fees  -.71*** -.67*** -.67*** -.76*** 
The Proportion of Government’s Financial Support for Daily Income  -.38** -.36* -.35* -.49** 
The Amount of Subsidies of Per Bed  .05 .03 .03 .04 
Staffing      
Percentage of Trained Caregivers    -.11 -.00 
Ratio of Professional Caregivers to Residents    .23 .06 
Ratio of Professional Physicians to Residents    .00 .01 
Percentage of Migratory Care Staff    .01 .00 
Turnover Rate    .20 .16 
The Availability of Services      
The Number of Services    .04 -.02 
Resident’s Characteristics      
Percentage Sum of Residents with ADLs     .23 
Constant 11.77 95.05 88.47 83.72 93.06 
R .10 -.60 .66 .66 .68 
R Square .01 .36 .43 .43 .46 
R Square Change .01 .35 .06 .00 .03 
ANOVA P. .434 .000 .002 .003 .002 
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Table 8: Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: There is a difference between government and nongovernment elder care homes in measures of facility characteristics, 
including economic resources, staffing, availability of services and residence characteristics.  
 Measures Mean Findings 
NonGov. Gov. 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a difference between 
government and nongovernment elder care 
homes in economic resources: Government-
owned elder care institutions are more likely to 
have more economic resources. 
 
 
Total Investment When Established 
(million RMB) 
1.0  4.7 Supported(p<.001) 
Government Investment (%) 3.4  83.3 Supported(p<.001) 
Daily Income-----Government’s 
Financial Support (%) 
1.9  30.2 Supported(p<.001) 
Daily Income-----Charging from 
residents (%) 
95.8  66.0 Supported(p<.001) 
The Amount of Subsidies of Every 
Bed(RMB) 
49.3  60.5 Supported(p<.01) 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a difference in staffing 
between government and nongovernment elder 
care homes: Government-owned elder care 
institutions are more likely to have higher level 
of staffing. 
Ratio of Professional Caregivers to 
Residents *100(%) 
9.8  13.6 Supported(p<.05) 
Ratio of Professional Physicians to 
Residents *100(%) 
0.7  1.5 Supported(p<.01) 
Trained Carers (%) 61.6  83.1 Supported(p<.01) 
% Migratory Care Staff 7.1  2.0 Supported(p<.01) 
Turn-Over Rate of Staff (%) 6.8  2.7 Supported(p<.01) 
Hypothesis 1c: There are differences in the 
availability of services between government and 
nongovernment elder care homes: Government-
owned elder care institutions are likely to have 
availability of greater number of services.  
The numbers of Seven Services 5.6  6.1 Supported(p<.05) 
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Hypothesis 1d: There is a difference in ADL 
level of residents received by government and 
nongovernment elder care homes: Government-
owned elder care homes are likely to have fewer 
residents with ADL impairments. 
% of Residents that Need Feeding 26.9 18.4 Rejected 
% of Residents that Need Dressing 58.3  50.6 Rejected 
% of Residents that Need Help with 
Moving 
58.9  47.6 Rejected 
Hypothesis 2: There is an association between the type of elder care homes (government vs. non-government) and health outcomes of care 
quality. 
 Measures Mean Findings 
NonGov. Gov. 
Hypothesis 2a: Residents in government-owned 
facilities are more likely to report lower levels of 
mortality. 
The Prevalence of Pressure Ulcer 
(%) 
.4 .1 Rejected 
The Prevalence of Physical Restrain 
Use (%) 
4.7 9.4 Rejected 
The Prevalence of Taking 
Hypnotic (%) 
16.2 21.8 Rejected 
The Prevalence of Taking 
Tranquilizer (%) 
2.4 1.9 Rejected 
Mortality Rate (%) 11.1 4.0 Supported(p<.01) 
 Predictors Findings 
Hypothesis 2a: Residents in government-owned 
facilities are more likely to report lower levels of 
mortality. 
The proportion of  Daily Income from Residents’ Fee Supported 
The Proportion of Government’s Financial Support for Daily 
Income 
Supported 
41 
 
CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
 The main purpose of the study was to understand the relationship between ownership and 
care quality in elder care homes. In this section, I attempt to use political economy theory to 
discuss the relationship between ownership and aging within the context of Chinese political 
economic and social cultural contexts, and individual’s aging experiences. Then, theoretical and 
policy implications will be presented for future studies. Finally, limitations and research 
implication of this study will be discussed. 
6.1 Economic Resources as Important Predictors for Care Quality 
 From the data statistics in Table 1, government ownership was the dominant form among 
elder care homes before 1990. After 1990, non government-owned elder care homes have rapidly 
developed. Specifically, 70% of the nongovernment elder care homes were established after 
2000. Non-government owned homes seem to gradually becoming the dominant form of elder 
care homes. However, government-owned homes as shown in earlier research have higher 
average number of beds and occupancy rate than non government-owned homes. In addition, 
government-owned elder care homes, as shown in this study, have superiority in obtaining 
economic resources from government, such as government’s investment when established, the 
government’s financial support for daily income, and the amount of government’s subsidies for 
every bed. Also shown in this study, government-owned elder care homes have better staffing 
level in ratio of professional caregivers to residents, ratio of professional physicians to residents, 
and percentage of trained care staff. However, non government-owned homes have higher 
percentage of migratory care staff and turn-over rate. Government-owned facilities also provide 
more services on average for residents compared to non government-owned.  
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No differences was found between these two types of homes in resident characteristics, 
which were identified when residents entered facilities and measured by the percentage of 
residents with ADLs. Finally, Government-owned facilities have lower mortality rate than non-
government-owned homes. But after controlling other four groups of variables, including 
economic resources, staffing, the availability of services, and residents’ characteristics, the 
correlation is not statistically significant. Two variables—the proportion of daily income charged 
from residents and the proportion of government’s financial support for daily income—were 
found statistically significant in predicting mortality rate.  
 These findings are consisted with results in previous study, in which government-owned 
homes have advantages in obtaining financial support and having higher staffing level, compared 
to non government-owned facilities (Zhan et al., 2006). Government-owned elder care homes 
could have enough financial support from the government for establishment and daily income. 
The stable financial support from the government is crucial for building good facilities, such as 
having the sufficient number of beds. According the study of Zhan and her colleagues (2006), 
elder care homes that are government-owned and government-funded tend to have better 
equipments for residents, such as indoor toilets, shower, and elevators. In contrast, private homes, 
some of which have the bed subsidies from government, tend to have simpler equipment and 
worse residential condition. Furthermore, the differences of availability of services between two 
different ownerships of homes were also influenced by government funding.  Government-
owned elder care homes that have enough financial support would build more types of services 
for residents, and non government-owned facilities that do not have enough financial support 
would be limited to expand services. 
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 The inequality of economic resources, which could also influence the staffing level, 
might bring up the salary gap for employees between government-owned and non government-
owned facilities (Zhan et al., 2006). The higher salary level would make the positions in 
government-owned facilities more attractive for applicants and in-service staff. Thus, non 
government-owned facilities, which have lower salary level, tend to have lower staffing level, 
which was indicated by the lower ratio of professional caregivers and physicians to residents, 
higher turn-over rate, and lower percentage of trained caregivers. Governmental funding would 
ensure the financial support for the expenses of for training caregivers, hiring sufficient number 
of staff, and reducing turn-over rate. 
No difference was found in the three measures of residents’ characteristics between these 
two types of elder care homes. This result does not lend support to the previous study in Nanjing 
which concluded that non government-owned homes have higher level of residents’ needs for 
assistance in ADLs than governmental homes (Feng et al., 2011). In the previous study, non-
government owned homes tend to accept residents with sicker and higher needs for caregiving 
than government-owned homes. The result in this study shared only marginal level of differences 
in residents’ two counts of ADL activities. Further studies are needed to further explore this issue.  
The sources of daily income between the two types of elder care facilities highly 
predicted the mortality rate after controlling for other four groups of covariates. Government-
owned elder care homes, which have lower proportions of income from residents and higher 
proportions from government funding, tend to have lower mortality rates. From the statistical 
results in Table 2, 66% of government-owned facilities charged from residents, compared to 95.8% 
of non government-owned facilities. Only 1.9% of non government-owned facilities obtained 
financial support from government for daily income, compared to 30.2% of government-owned 
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facilities. The differences indicated that government-owned facilities have superior financial 
support to supplement daily income, while most non government-owned facilities could only 
depend on the residents’ payments. One explanation for this result is that government-owned 
elder care homes were likely to “be reserved exclusively for the upper class or newly rich 
families as well as retired government cadres” (Zhan et al., 2006, p. 104). Government-owned 
elder care homes also accepted social-welfare recipients (Zhan et al., 2006), who was similar to 
Medicaid receivers in the United States. The social-welfare recipients often refers to persons 
with “three no”, who had no income, no child and no ability to support oneself (Chen, 1996). 
Due to the high service charges and limited admission, most elders with physical needs may have 
few options for choosing government-owned facilities which provide better care.  
Shown as in Table 7, whether from government support or individual fees, economic 
resources are important predictors for mortality. As inequality increases in China, this could 
mean that the rich could pay for higher quality of care. Or the powerful, such as government 
official, are more likely to utilize government funded elder care home. This emerging social 
inequality deserves more attention in future research.  
6.2 Theoretical Implications 
 This study uses the insights from the political economical theory of aging. The variables 
selected for this study are informed by the SPO framework. The link among structure, process, 
and outcome was explored in this empirical study.  This study only emphasized the relationship 
between ownership and other measures in SPO framework. The future studies could explore 
more relationship among those measures in SPO framework, such as causal correlation among 
measures of structure, process, and outcome.  
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As shown from the study, the distribution of economic resources influenced care quality, 
and care quality differed by ownership. According to Estes (2001), government plays an 
important role in distributing resources for social services. Individual aging experience is 
influenced by inequality of resource distribution due to social policies determined by the 
government. In this study, the Chinese government provides more financial support to 
governmental elder care homes, and the inequality of funding is shown to influence the 
differences in health outcomes of residents between governmental and nongovernmental elder 
care homes.  
 The pension systems and insurance scheme may further influence individual aging 
experiences. As more and more elders are likely to choose institutional care, elder-care facilities 
are likely to be in greater demand due to reduced family size and available pension. Yet, as 
shown, care quality in elder care homes are influenced by government funding. Combining these 
factors, government policies are increasing the inequalities of distribution of economic resources 
by first ensuring the interest of the government-own facilities in the hierarchy. With the rapid 
development of economic since 1990s’s reform, Chinese government seems unprepared to take 
over the responsibilities to corresponding reforms in social welfare systems (Chen, 1996; Chen, 
2012). In the future, the Chinese government may need to minimize the inequality of resource 
distribution in order to maximize quality of life for most aging individuals in China.   
6.3 Policy Implications 
With the increasing older population in China, elder care institutions have been 
developing rapidly after 1990s.  Quality control is also becoming an important issue. In their 
study, Zhan and her colleagues (2006) found rooms in some elder care homes had more than 10 
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beds, and residents in those rooms had to share daily activities without dignity and privacy. 
Quality issues in elder care homes have policy implications and deserve special attention. 
First, there is no standardized approach to measure care quality in all institutions. The 
department of Chinese governments that manage elder care homes should support the 
development of quality measures and ensure the process of implementation and maintenance of 
quality measures. In the United States, Minimum Data Set (MDS) and Online Survey 
Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) are the two largest sources of nationwide data collection 
for measuring care quality in nursing homes, and the former at residential level, and the latter at 
staff level (Zhang et al., 2009). The performance of nursing homes could be improved according 
to the reporting and analysis of data collected through administrative data. This could be a good 
reference for measuring Chinese elder care in institutions.  
Second, Chinese government could initiate programs that reward performances of elder 
care homes through financial incentives, based on standardized measures of care quality. In the 
United States, “pay for performance” programs, which intend to measure and reward better 
performance of nursing homes and maximize the value of expenditure from public and private, 
have been implemented in some states (Arling et al, 2009). The U.S. government had 
traditionally regulated care quality through fines and sanctions toward poor care in facilities 
(Arling et al, 2009). The approach of financial incentive such as pay-for-performance programs 
could strive for high-quality care and make a good reference for improving care quality in 
Chinese elder care homes. 
Third, the results in this study raise the concern for government’s financial support for 
private elder care homes. To ensure care quality, government financial support to non-
government facilities may need to be increased. With the opening of free market for the industry 
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of elder care homes, private homes have developed rapidly and become the dominant form to 
meet the needs of most Chinese elders. Government has recently initiated some programs to 
improve care quality and capacity of elder care homes, such as “Star Light Program” and 
“Beloved Care Engineering” (Chu & Chi, 2008). Although government has made an effort to 
meet the challenges of population aging in China, the aging of baby boomers could pose further 
challenges in order to ensure the quality of care for the large number of aging baby boomers. 
Finally, facilities for long term elder care in China could not be distinguished according 
to provision of special care, due to the short development history of elder care industry (Zhan et 
al., 2006). Unlike the U.S., the distinction between assisted living facilities and nursing homes in 
China is missing. The lack of specification of elder care home is likely to increase the cost of 
caregiving and to decrease care quality.   
6.4 Limitations 
This research uses a secondary data set and the questionnaire for data collection was not 
specifically designed for this research. Thus analyses have to be performed based on available 
variables in the data. This limitation of data may affect the interpretation of research results. 
Furthermore, this study is based on one site—Tianjin, China, a large urban area.  
Findings may not be representative of all cities in China due to geographic differences, level of 
economic development, and difference in elderly dependency ratio. Tianjin, second to Shanghai, 
has a very high proportion of the elderly population, and the number of elderly residing in elder 
care institutions may be higher than other cities, especially interior ones. Consequently, the 
results of this study may be more an understanding of the city itself; rather than nationally 
representative results. Interpretation of the data and findings should take caution. Nevertheless, 
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this study is one of the first to tackle the relationship between the state and the aging experiences 
in China. It may provide insight for policy makers both in China and the US. 
Finally, the data of this study was collected by self-report at a staff level; the results 
might have ecological fallacy and information bias. For example, among 157 elder homes, only 
19 homes reported pressure ulcer, and other homes reported the number of “0”. Pressure ulcer 
was an important variable to indicate care quality, especially for bed-bound residents. The report 
of clinic health outcomes by residents could greatly supplement the report from staff. This could 
indicate under reporting of various quality measures in the study. 
6.5 Research Implications 
 Limited information is available about long term care facilities in China. Being one of the 
first studies about facility organizations, this study yields first hand data about long term care 
facilities at aggregated level. Consequently, there are several major limitations. First, this 
research is only a quantitative study at a facility level. Little is known about actual quality of care 
from the perspectives of care-recipients or family members. Future research could collect 
qualitative data to supplement quantitative study to allow a more in-depth understanding of 
quality of care from various perspectives.  Furthermore, the data for this study was only collected 
in 2010, and a longitudinal study, or time-series study, could be designed to find differences in 
quality of care over a period of time among different elder care homes. The long-term 
investigation would yield more accurate data to allow a better understanding of the relationship 
between government and non-government facilities in relation to care quality. After a certain 
period of time, could market competition drive up the quality of care? Or quality of care 
continues to rely on government funding? These questions can only be answered with time 
through longitudinal studies.  Findings to these questions will shed light not only for China, but 
49 
 
 
for other aging societies in models of long term care.  Finally, because the measurements for this 
study were established based on the United States’ setting, and some factors reflecting the 
relationship in Chinese setting may have been omitted. Future research could develop a set of 
measurements that are sensitive to the context of Chinese elder care homes.  
6.6 Conclusions 
This research aims to explore the inequality of the distribution of social resources for the 
aged in the context of different-ownership nursing homes. The results indicate that the Chinese 
government continues to play an important role in institutional long term care; in addition, 
residents’ care quality and life quality is positively correlated with the government ownership of 
facilities. Findings provide insights for government policy makers, researchers, and other 
scholars for a greater understanding of factors influencing quality of care for older adults in 
China.  
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